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DOES INTEGRATED INFORMATION LACK SUBJECTIVITY?
summary: I investigate the status of subjectivity in Integrated Information Theory. This 
leads me to examine if Integrated Information Theory can answer the hard problem of con-
sciousness. On itself, Integrated Information Theory does not seem to constitute an answer to 
the hard problem, but could be combined with panpsychism to yield a more satisfying theory 
of consciousness. I will show, that even if Integrated Information Theory employs the meta-
physical machinery of panpsychism, Integrated Information would still suffer from a different 
problem, not being able to account for the subjective character of consciousness.
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Integrated Information Theory (IIT) (Tononi, 2008; Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi 
& Koch, 2015) is a neuroscientific theory that seeks to answer the questions about the 
nature of consciousness. What physical systems are conscious and of what are they 
conscious of? How much consciousness there is in a system if it could be measured. 
What is the difference in levels of consciousness in a newborn baby, an animal like a 
bat or a fruit fly or in vegetative patients with just „islands” of brain activity? Answer-
ing these hard philosophical and scientific questions would also have clear and sig-
nificant practical merits in leading to better understanding of borderline conscious 
states in brain-damaged patients. The corollaries of Integrated Information seem to be 
that things like aggregates and machines are not conscious, though some other unex-
pected entities, like photodiodes, are. Still, a photodiode’s experience is both quanti-
tatively and qualitatively minimal. 
In the first section of the paper, I will put forward axioms of Integrated Information 
Theory that are to be examined in the remainder. In the second section, I will discuss 
if Integrated Information Theory could answer the hard problem of consciousness, as 
defined by Chalmers (1996). In order to answer „the hard“ question, it might be ben-
eficial for IIT to interpret it as a version of panpsychism, as some philosophers have 
argued. This would supply the necessary metaphysics needed to answer the hard prob-
lem of consciousness. One interpretation of IIT is that it is an emergentist panpsychist 
theory of consciousness. This position will be examined in Section 3 of the paper. I 
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will argue in Section 4 that, even if IIT is interpreted as panpsychist, it would still 
suffer from a further problem, that it does not account for the subjectivity of conscious-
ness. Versions of panpsychism that come to the aid of IIT are also plagued by the same 
problem. To explicate further on this drawback of panpsychist IIT I will appeal to no-
tions of mineness and pre-reflective self-awareness that have been prominent in recent 
work on subjectivity in authors like Zahavi, Kriegel and Nida-Rumelin. The aim of 
this paper is humble: to investigate the status of subjectivity (the subjective character 
of consciousness) in Integrated Information Theory, that is, to examine if subjectivity 
is properly accommodated by IIT or to see if it is taken into account at all by this 
theory of consciousness.
1. Information Integration
Let us put forth some essentials of Integrated Information Theory. Adherents of 
IIT start by taking consciousness seriously and defend axioms and postulates concern-
ing it. Axioms are the essential phenomenological properties of consciousness. These 
are taken by authors of IIT to be „immediately evident“. This in itself can be very 
problematic, but let’s take the axioms as they stand in IIT and see where they would 
take us. Five axioms of the Information Integration are existence, composition, infor-
mation, integration and exclusion (Oizumi et al . 2014; Tononi & Koch, 2015). The 
first axiom, that of intrinsic existence (Tononi & Koch, 2015) tells us that conscious-
ness exists. This is unquestionable. IIT is a theory that respects phenomenology and 
takes the existence of consciousness as a fact.
The second axiom, composition, appeals to experiential combination: „Conscious-
ness is compositional (structured): each experience consists of multiple aspects in vari-
ous combinations.” (Oizumi et al., 2014, p. 2). Our phenomenal field is made up of many 
experiences combined together. Does holism come first and out of the unity of con-
sciousness we „carve” out the many distinct experiences later? We will come to this 
question later when the problem of the unity of consciousness is analyzed (Section 4). 
The third axiom, information, claims that consciousness is informative: „each 
experience differs in its particular way from other possible experiences“ (Oizumi et 
al., 2014, p. 2). Then, with the fourth axiom, comes holism again: „Consciousness is 
integrated: each experience is (strongly) irreducible to non-interdependent compo-
nents.” (Oizumi et al., 2014, p. 3). So, „experience” is also something over and above 
its components. Observe that this seems to go against what was said in the second 
axiom since the composition is nothing over and above the sum of its parts. Integration 
is the most important axiom because it grounds the information integration in the first 
place. Finally, there is the axiom of exclusion that states: „Consciousness is exclusive: 
each experience excludes all others – at any given time there is only one experience 
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having its full content, rather than a superposition of multiple partial experiences; each 
experience has definite borders – certain things can be experienced and others cannot; 
each experience has a particular spatial and temporal grain – it flows at a particular 
speed, and it has a certain resolution such that some distinctions are possible and 
finer or coarser distinctions are not” (Oizumi et al., 2014, p. 3). Exclusion contains a 
boundary principle and an implication that no conscious subject’s parts are themselves 
conscious. 
These phenomenological truths are mirrored in postulates of the physical sub-
strates that realize phenomenology. Postulates state what are the properties that phys-
ical mechanisms must have in order to support consciousness and identity is the rela-
tion between the phenomenal and the physical in IIT. Names of postulates are the same 
as names of axioms, but they pertain to cause-effect structures since causation as in-
formation is the „shadow“ aspect of experience. For IIT, Tononi has taken Bateson’s 
(1972) position on information: „Information is a difference that makes a difference.“
Authors state in the first postulate that a system of mechanisms must exist intrinsi-
cally. That means that it has cause-effect power independent of extrinsic factors, „pow-
er upon itself”. This is one pointer in the direction of subjectivity as an aspect of con-
sciousness and towards an account of it that we find in IIT, though from a point of a 
system of mechanisms. Every system is structured, it has subsystems. The system has a 
particular cause–effect structure, given the information postulate. The system is intrinsi-
cally irreducible (unified) and the cause-effect structure is definite. The structure that is 
maximally irreducible intrinsically is a conceptual structure made of maximally irreduc-
ible cause–effect concepts, as per Exclusion (Tononi & Koch, 2015, p. 7). 
Regarding the mechanisms that support or are the correlates of consciousness, 
authors say: „Integrated information is information that is generated by the whole 
mechanism above and beyond the information generated by its parts. This means that, 
with respect to information, the mechanism is irreducible.” (Oizumi et al., 2014, p. 
7). Tononi and Koch also make the following claim of identity: „Identity: an experi-
ence is identical to a conceptual structure that is maximally irreducible intrinsically 
(MICS, a constellation of concepts in qualia space)... a conceptual structure com-
pletely specifies both the quantity and the quality of experience: how much the system 
exists—the quantity or level of consciousness—is measured by its Φmax  value—the 
intrinsic irreducibility of the conceptual structure; which way it exists—the quality or 
content of consciousness—is specified by the shape of the conceptual structure.” 
(Tononi & Koch, 2015, p. 9).
Therefore, IIT should be able to measure the quantity and quality of experience in 
a system, the level of consciousness in a system. Even if this is true, should we con-
clude that IIT is a fair description of what it means to be conscious? This has to do 
with answering the hard problem of consciousness and, ultimately, with phenomenol-
ogy and subjectivity of consciousness. 
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2. Problems of consciousness
Chalmers (1995) has made the canonical distinction between easy and hard prob-
lems of consciousness. The really tough problem that needs answering is why and how 
do we get to have consciousness in a materialistic world? How does it come about 
from physical systems? „How does the brain process environmental stimulation? How 
does it integrate information? How do we produce reports on internal states? These 
are important questions, but to answer them is not to solve the hard problem: Why is 
all this processing accompanied by an experienced inner life?” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 
12). Easy problems concern the cognitive questions about consciousness. The hard 
problems are the ones that come from human phenomenology. The very fact that we 
have a phenomenology (whether it is of a feeling or a thought) is a mystery in itself. 
Or so it appears to be. Theories of consciousness should give an answer to the hard 
problem of consciousness. The question to ask now is, does IIT as a neuroscientific 
account of consciousness answer the hard problem? 
Recently, Aaronson has criticized IIT saying that it does not solve the hard prob-
lem. He argues that it is also unable to answer „the pretty-hard“ problem of conscious-
ness. Aaronson  defines „the pretty-hard“ problem as a problem: „how to construct a 
theory that tells us which physical systems are conscious and which aren’t – giving 
answers that agree with ‘common sense’ whenever the latter renders a verdict – is one 
of the deepest, most fascinating problems in all of science” (Aaronson, 2014). To 
answer this worry a theory of consciousness needs to tell us which system is conscious 
and this has to agree with our common sense intuitions about what conscious entities 
are. Since IIT posits consciousness in all sorts of counter-intuitive places and entities 
(like photodiodes), it does not even constitute an answer to the pretty-hard problem. 
Chalmers has analyzed the pretty-hard problem into several distinct problems and 
claims that IIT is a partial answer to at least one of them: „Construct a theory that tells 
us, for any given physical system, which states of consciousness are associated with 
that system“.1 Aaronson goes on to argue that although a large Phi value (that is central 
to IIT) may be a necessary condition for physical systems to be conscious, it is still 
not a sufficient condition for consciousness.
From the quoted Chalmers’ passage, it would seem that Information Integration is 
a part of the answer to the easy questions of consciousness: „When we think and per-
ceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As 
Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism.“ (Chalm-
ers, 1995, p. 3). It appears that IIT, after all, doesn’t really approach the hard problem. 
IIT seems to lack the metaphysical „heavy machinery” to answer this problem. Some-
thing more is needed for IIT to constitute a valid solution to the hard problem. 
1 See Mindt (2014) for discussion.
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Others have already pointed out this problem with IIT and speculated that perhaps 
it would be beneficial to merge IIT with panpsychism (another alternative is Russellian 
monist panpsychism). It was pointed out that the authors of IIT already argued that 
the theory entails a form of panpsychism. Panpsychism would help IIT solve the hard 
problem of consciousness and IIT would help panpsychism solve its distinctive prob-
lem of combination. In this paper, I will not consider other possible interpretations of 
ITT, like the one that understands IIT as more akin to the dual-aspect theory of Chalm-
ers (1996), but just concern myself with the panpsychist interpretation.
Since Integrated Information Theory is undefined and vague about many concepts 
that are of importance to the whole issue of consciousness to the extent that it may be 
questionable what it is a theory of2, it may prove beneficial to improve on this theory 
with some metaphysical clarification. We need to see what could be improved in In-
tegrated Information Theory given its merging with panpsychism. More on this will 
be said in the next section. I will lay out the basic postulations of panpsychism. Even 
though merging of panpsychism with IIT could prove important for both Integrated 
Information panpsychism, in Section 4 I will point out a new problem for the improved 
Integrated Information Theory.
3. Panpsychist Integrated Information
Roughly put, panpsychism is a metaphysical theory that claims everything in nature 
has a modicum of consciousness. Though it may seem counter-intuitive or even down-
right crazy, panpsychism was conceived in order to overcome the deficiencies and prob-
lems of both physicalism and dualism.3 Panpsychism should successfully answer the 
hard problem. If IIT is interpreted as physicalist, then it would suffer the same problem 
of explaining consciousness as other physicalist and materialist positions. In modern 
literature on panpsychism it is argued that the position comes with a set of its own, new 
problems, those of combination. The most plausible form of panpsychism (the one that 
avoids emergence), constitutive panpsychism runs into difficulties.4 Constitutive pan-
psychism posits that macroconsciousness is grounded in microconsciousness, macro-
experience just has those microexperiences as parts and it inherits their properties. Com-
2  As Ned Block remarked at one point to Tononi: „You have a theory of something, I am just not 
sure what it is“. See Cerullo (2015).
3  For more on this see Chalmers (2015).
4  For more on this see Coleman (2013). It was Goff (2009) who argued that set of subjects does 
not a priori entail the existence of another subject. Coleman goes on to strengthen Goff’s claim 
that it is metaphysically impossible to combine subjects to yield new subjects and this leads 
one to dismiss constitutive panpsychism to avoid brute emergence. 
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bination problem arises when we try to understand how o-consciousness or macro-
consciousness (that we pre-theoretically know in ourselves) comes from fundamental 
micro-consciousness of its parts. The problem is especially hard when it relates the 
combination of micro-subjects (if these exist) into macro-subjects of humans.
According to Chalmers, three different aspects of phenomenal states yield three 
different combination problems: the subject combination problem, the quality combi-
nation problem, and the structure combination problem (Chalmers, 2015).5 The hard-
est of all problems seems to be the subject combination problem or subject-summing. 
If panpsychism is merged with IIT (or if IIT is interpreted as a form of panpsychism), 
perhaps, then IIT could help panpsychism solve some of these combination problems. 
Though it may seem possible to imagine IIT attributing to the understanding of how 
macro-qualities arise from micro-qualities and how experience is integrated, at least 
prima facie, it is not so easy to see how the same could hold for subject-summing. 
Subjects of experience don’t seem to be the entities that are open to combination or 
processes of fusion/merging. This could even be a conceptual impossibility. Of all 
three problems, I will be concerned with the third, that of combination of subjects, 
since it is directly related to issues of subjectivity.
Is there reason to interpret IIT as a panpsychist theory? How could one corroborate 
such a thesis? It was Chalmers who first argued for the deep connection of information 
and experience: „If there is experience associated with thermostats, there is probably 
experience everywhere: wherever there is a causal interaction, there is information, 
and wherever there is information, there is experience.” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 297) And 
a bit later: „it suggests a view in which the experiences in simple systems such as at-
oms are fundamental, and in which complex experiences are somehow the sum of such 
simpler experiences. While this is one way things could go, there is no reason that 
things have to go this way: complex experiences may be more autonomous than this 
suggests. In particular, the informational view suggests a picture on which complex 
experiences are determined more holistically than this” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 299). In 
panpsychist terms, this is close to a position like panqualityism6, which tends to deflate 
the subject of experience, reducing it to just structures of qualities.7 
5  Chalmers finds two additional problems: „There is the unity problem: how do microexperiences come 
together to yield a unified consciousness? There is the boundary problem (Rosenberg 1998): how do 
microexperiences come together to yield a bounded consciousness?” Roelofs (2015, 132) defines it 
as „Essential Boundedness (EB): The set of experiences belonging to any subject is bounded.”
6  Coleman’s version of panpsychism in which the basic, intrinsic properties are qualities as 
‘unexperienced qualia’. 
7  Similarly, Cerullo (2015) has pointed out that IIT’s panpsychism is a version of panexperien-
tialism. Cerullo argues that „theories of panexperientialism, therefore, measure protoconscio-
usness (or proto-mentality) rather than consciousness“ (Cerullo 2015, 8). So, on his interpre-
tation, IIT would be a theory of „partial-panexperientialism“. As a panpsychist, Rosenberg 
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One possible understanding of IIT would be to view it as a form of emergent pan-
psychism. Chalmers points to the emergentist inclinations of IIT: „Giulio Tononi’s 
integrated information theory (2008), which puts forward a principle connecting de-
grees of integrated information with states of consciousness, can also be construed as 
a form of emergent panpsychism. If we see Tononi’s principle as a fundamental law 
of nature, then it appears that macroexperiences are strongly emergent from certain 
physical configurations” (Chalmers, 2016, p. 16). 
Luke Roelofs views Tononi as a physicalist-panpsychist. He points out that a 
physicalist combinationist like Tononi would claim that information integration is the 
experiential bonding8 but that we learn of it by observing brain structure, so this will 
leave primitivists about consciousness unsatisfied. For Roelofs, Tononi provides a 
theoretical rationale for boundedness of consciousness with Exclusion (Roelofs, 2015, 
p. 132) and this is an argument against combinationism.9 Tononi defends Exclusion 
from phenomenology and parsimony. On the other hand, Shani interprets these authors 
(Koch, Tononi) as saying that information integration generates consciousness, which 
would be a „non-panpsychist idea“ (Shani, 2015). Panpsychism assumes that sentience 
is combined and amassed into larger unities (macro-level consciousness) form small-
er ones (micro-level consciousness), not from something non-sentient. Contrary to 
Shani’s claim, it seems to me that IIT defenders take information to be imbued with 
sentience on all levels (or they should if they are to avoid the danger of radical emer-
gence, the emergence of experience from something non-experiential).
There is no aggregation in IIT (Tononi and Koch, 2015). Integration axiom implies 
emergence in conscious experience. Subjectivity could be what unifies experiences 
from inside. Also, one way to interpret Exclusion is as stating causal emergence in 
Integrated Information. I think it would be better to read Exclusion as stating that 
experience comes in discrete, unified subjects (individuals). If this integration is miss-
ing, then there is no subjectivity in IIT. It all depends on how we view subjectivity, as 
just relations between experiences (deflationary) or as something more. In any case, 
on the panpsychist interpretation (with a panpsychist „twist“), IIT is better equipped 
metaphysically to deal with the hard problem of consciousness. If understood as a 
form of panpsychism, IIT avoids postulating radical emergence. These are the good 
sides of panpsychism that IIT inherits. This is all well, but what about subjectivity and 
subject-summing? Can the panpsychist IIT avoid these problems? 
(2004, Chapter 5) expounds a close form of panexperientialism, the view that experience is 
everywhere in nature, but it is only in a subject of experience bounded in the qualitative field. 
The boundaries of the field individuate subjects.
8  Phenomenal bonding relation. 
9  The position of constitutive panpsychists who defend the plausibility of combination of expe-
riences and subjects.
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There are many ways one may try to solve the aforementioned combination prob-
lems. One common strategy used to answer the subject-summing problem is to deflate 
the subjects of experience, meaning that one denies that experiences need to have 
subjects „or at least denying that subjects are metaphysically and conceptually simple 
entities“ (Chalmers 2015, 271). If subjects are simple entities, fusion of such subjects 
into larger ones seems not so plausible.10  
Therefore, in order to alleviate the pressure of subject-summing, panpsychists 
deflate the subject instead. The emergence of macro-subject from micro-subjects is 
less plausible if subjects are fundamental, simple entities. If IIT is understood in pan-
psychist terms, we see the same worry expressed in the Exclusion postulate of Infor-
mation Integration. Since IIT accommodates split-brain cases and fission of subjects, 
it would then seem to subscribe to the fusionist panpsychist accounts akin to that of 
one William Seager (Seager, 2010). Some, like Roelofs and Mørch, suggest that the 
phenomenal bonding relation11 could be Information Integration. So IIT could help 
explain the fusion view (Seager, 2010, Mørch, 2014). Macrophenomenal properties 
are fusions of microphenomenal ones. Micro-subject fuse into macro-subjects at a 
later time (diachronic emergent combination).
It seems arguable that Integrated Information Theory would subscribe to a defla-
tionary account of subjectivity. It would reduce subjects to experience and its relations, 
at best, even given its panpsychist interpretation. In the next section, I will show that 
IIT is lacking this important aspect that every theory of consciousness should have, 
that is, to be able to account for the subjective character of consciousness. Panpsycist 
theories that are supposed to help IIT get off the ground are also plagued by the same 
problem. In the paper, I will confine my criticism to Integrated Information Theory 
and its phenomenological axioms.12
10  For discussion, see Coleman’s (2013) anti-summing arguments. Some philosophers would 
argue that experientiality (the quality of experience, as a broader term, as opposed to subjec-
tivity or the „subjective character“ of experience) is the constant in consciousness. Even the 
weaker notion of the subject is abandoned in some panpsychist accounts. This is not so hard to 
understand, given that experience is something that we can more easily imagine being subject 
to processes like fusion and fission, merging and combination. Galen Strawson’s theory of 
SESMETs (short for „subject-of-experience-as-single-mental-thing”) is not very clear on this. 
Although he argues for the identity of subjects and experience, and even though persistent 
subjects are deflated to „thin subjects”, they are not eliminated from experience. Subjectivity 
(and with it the „thin subject“) is still an aspect of an experience that has to be reckoned with.
11  Phenomenal bonding relation, a special kind of relation that holds between subjects of experien-
ce (Goff, 2009) or between experiences within a subject (this could be the „co-consciousness“ 
relation).
12  I criticize panpsychist deflation of subjects in a different paper, Nešić (2017).
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4. Intrinsic perspective
The biggest drawback of IIT and a persistent problem for the theory, even if it is 
improved by panpsychism, would still be that it posits no subjectivity, no point-of-
view-edness. This is the claim of my paper. It would seem a conceptual truth13 that 
every experience has an experiencer (subject). Any good theory of consciousness 
needs to explain subjectivity, say something about the nature of subjects. Even if one 
is not a defender of subjects as fundamental ontological entities, one has to acknowl-
edge that something, broadly construed, as „subjective character“ of consciousness, 
very likely exists.14 So, „any satisfying theory of consciousness has to account for the 
first-personal access to our own consciousness” (Zahavi, 2005, p. 13). The hard prob-
lem of consciousness also demands this. 
There are two distinct aspects of phenomenally conscious states, something it’s like 
to be in a mental state and what it’s like to be in that state. Phenomenally conscious 
mental states have a qualitative character and a subjective character (Levine, 2001; 
Kriegel 2009). These are separate questions of the subjectivity and quality of conscious-
ness and these very often seem to be lumped together. The subjective designates how a 
certain mental state feels to the subject. On a more precise reading, it is revealed that this 
actually means that the subject is somehow present in experience, as a kind of self-
awareness. Mineness, subjective character, for-me-ness are sometimes meant to reflect 
or stand in for the pre-reflective self-consciousness of the Phenomenological tradition. 
That there seems to exist something like self-consciousness in the pre-reflective and 
pre-conceptual sense is hold as highly plausible by many phenomenologists and phi-
losophers of mind. It is also called pre-reflective self-awareness. This self-consciousness 
in question is not of the cognitive kind, deployed in I-thoughts, but minimal and non-
reflexive. Mineness refers to the feeling that all experience in consciousness is „mine“, 
synchronic and diachronic. But this term can have several readings and they can be very 
different. In her recent paper, Marie Guillot  proposes that subjective character refers to 
several distinct notions that are being confused by some authors: for-me-ness (a relation 
of awareness between a subject and an experience), me-ness (a reflexive relation of 
awareness a subject has to itself) and mineness (a relation of awareness between subject 
and a fact that it owns the experience) and all these are about relations of awareness 
13  See Chalmers (2015) for discussion.
14  Among modern philosophers who take such notions of subjectivity serious are Zahavi (2005, 
2014), Gallagher (2000), Fasching (2009), Kriegel (2009), Strawson (2009), Levine (2001), 
Shoemaker (1996), to name just a few. The subjective character can thus refer to pre-reflec-
tive self-consciousness, self-awareness, mineness, etc. Nida-Rümelin (2014) shows there are 
three interpretations of what „subjective character“ could mean: basic intentionality, primitive 
awareness and awareness of basic intentionality. Only in the third sense are we speaking of 
pre-reflexive self-awareness.
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between a subject and its experiences (Guillot 2017, p. 32). The third notion is the stron-
gest, but all three imply the presence of a subject of experience.
What is missing in IIT, and what could help us make sense of boundedness of expe-
rience, and, ultimately, make sense of Integrated Information, is the subjective character 
of experience. Even if IIT could help panpsychism solve the structure combination and 
quality combination problems, subject-summing would be left untouched. Adherents of 
IIT, at least, seem to be aware of the need for this subjective aspect. „Information – the 
ability to discriminate among a large number of alternatives – may thus be essential for 
consciousness. However, information always implies a point of view, and we need to be 
careful about what that point of view might be” (Tononi, 2008, p. 218). In IIT the 
maximally irreducible conceptual structure specified by a complex exists intrinsically 
(from its own intrinsic perspective). Shanahan (2015, 9) also points out that IIT: „is un-
able to account for the sort of self-knowledge it takes to be axiomatic“.
The maximally irreducible conceptual structure is identical to the integrated ex-
perience in the same way the subject is identical to its stream of consciousness, to the 
total experiential field. Every experience and thus every information is always a part 
of some subject, always marked by the first-person givenness, so every information 
in a system is also marked by the subjectivity of it and there can be no other conscious 
subsystem (Exclusion).
This could mean that subjectivity is an aspect only of Integrated Information and 
of the system that realizes it. And there is the identity of phenomenological properties 
of experience and causal/informational properties, so it would seem that intrinsic 
perspective is not present in every experience as such, but in the integrated whole of 
information/experience. Authors state that maximally irreducible conceptual structure 
is identical to its experience (Oizumi et al., 2014, p. 3). If Integrated Information is 
not regarded as something more than combination of experience/information, IIT is 
in danger of becoming a deflationist theory of consciousness. It would reduce subjects 
to experience or completely remove them from the metaphysical picture. 
This brings us to the highly debated question of unity of consciousness and what 
it is. How should we understand the unity of consciousness? Chalmers and Bayne 
(2003) define it with The Unity Thesis: „Necessarily, any set of conscious states of a 
subject at a time is unified”. If consciousness is unified, one needs to explain why is 
there such a striking unity, what brings all the conscious states into one unified expe-
rience. One way to explain the unity of consciousness is with the „co-consciousness“ 
relation. One proposed solution to the subject-summing problem (that could be en-
dorsed by proponents of IIT)  is the phenomenal bonding strategy (Goff, 2009), posit-
ing a special kind of relation holding between subjects, though the nature of this rela-
tion is unknown to us. This is because we can only introspect within a subject. Chalm-
ers (2016) proposes that the phenomenal bonding could be the „co-consciousness” 
relation. But what this „co-consciousness“ relation really is, how to understand it? 
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And how is it different from phenomenal bonding? One could ask if it helps one ex-
plain the unity of consciousness or does it just state a fact.
IIT acknowledges the existence and importance of unity of consciousness as this 
is stated in the second and the fourth axiom. The basic claim in IIT is that conscious-
ness (and information) is integrated, but there is no explanation as to why is that the 
case and how is that the case. IIT could be compatible, on the ground of Exclusion, 
with a subjectivist account of consciousness. But, the subjective character that is argu-
ably present in our experience and is not mentioned by the current version of IIT is 
the first-person givenness or mineness of experience (Zahavi, 2005).15 The authors of 
IIT claim that Information Integration is the relation that keeps the subject „bounded”. 
They postulate the identity of consciousness and Information Integration.16 If we say 
that the subject is Integrated Information, that does not include any mineness and 
would be in line with a deflationist theory of the self/subject.
On the phenomenological understanding, subjectivity is like a dimension or a 
space that grounds any phenomenal relations and experiential properties. Subjectiv-
ity could be the space where experience is manifested, and the relation of the subject 
to its experiences could be the same as space-time is related to its material objects. If 
the subjective character is conceived in the sense of mineness, it cannot be explained 
just by relations between experiences, it would have to refer to or imply a subject of 
experience. In the words of Wolfgang Fasching (2009): „‘one awareness’ (the togeth-
erness of the manifold synchronically co-conscious experiential contents) is not a 
result of any relations between the experiential contents, of some synthesis of them… 
the character of a dimension in which the contents, with all their relations, have their 
presence in the first place’’ (2009, p. 143-144). 
According to those who follow the Phenomenological tradition and accept the 
notions of mineness and pre-reflective self-awareness, what unifies experiences is the 
subject of experience, and because of it, consciousness is phenomenologically marked 
by pre-reflective self-awareness, first-personal givenness or mineness (Guillot, 2017; 
Zahavi, 2005, 2014; Fasching, 2009, 2011; Strawson, 2009). There is something more 
to a stream of consciousness than just experiences and their relations. Subjectivity thus 
understood implies that there might be an experiential or minimal self (Zahavi, 2014; 
Strawson, 2009). Dan Zahavi defends a position called experiential minimalism in 
which the for-me-ness or first-personal givenness dimension of phenomenal con-
sciousness is the minimal experiential self. Though we can imagine qualitative Perfect 
Twins, there is a further fact that is not entailed by those qualities, and that makes them 
15  Guillot argues that what Zahavi has in mind when he talks about mineness actually is for-me-ness.
16  One could imagine a possible (and rather generous) interpretation of IIT that would state that 
Φmax measures the value of the subjective character, the level of subjectivity and, hence, the 
level of consciousness of a system.
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distinct: their respective individuate first-person perspectives, argues Zahavi. His po-
sition is similar to Galen Strawson’s (2009) „thin“ self theory17, with the difference 
being that the experiential self is diachronically persistent in Zahavi’s account.18 
Saying that subjectivity is the same as Information Integration does not reveal the 
full truth about subjectivity. Information Integration, like phenomenal bonding, is a 
relation. If there is something like pre-reflective self-awareness in the sense that phi-
losophers like Zahavi, Nida-Rumelin, Siewert, Guillot and others understand it, at 
least some routes of defending subject-summing seem to be blocked. One way to 
imagine how subject-summing is possible is by way of the „co-consciousness“ relation 
(Dainton 2011). Contrary to that, I think that phenomenology of self-awareness tells 
us that the fact about „co-consciousness“ is based in the fact that experiences belong 
to the same subject (not the other way round). This goes to show that regarding phe-
nomenal bonding as „co-consciousness“ is implausible. 
Slors and Jongepier (2014) argue, in their paper, that mineness of experience is a 
product of the external structure of experience. They defend a reductionist, coherent-
ist account of mineness and argue against Zahavi’s account of mineness. As a conse-
quence of their approach, these philosophers deny there is any phenomenological 
datum to mineness. There are no minimal selves in their theory. Still, they would agree 
with Zahavi in that „thoughts are endowed with a first-personal givenness - how can 
they fail to be?“ (2014, p. 216). From what we have seen, this is what seems to be the 
case in Integrated Information as well, and a defender of Integrated Information The-
ory could endorse the coherentist account.
Similarly to the situation in Coleman’s panqualityism, it is conceivable that a 
system with Integrated Information lacks awareness - though it has information/ex-
perience integration, it would be an „awareness zombie“ (Chalmers) and not a subject 
of experience.19 Attempts to „functionalize“ awareness, and this would be the case in 
IIT also, eradicate the phenomenology of awareness, which is very unpalatable.20 
17  Strawson’s „thin“ selves are brief, perishing pulses of experience, momentary subjects of 
experience. The human stream of consciousness is made up of many such „thin“ subjects, nu-
merically distinct thinkers and there is a special „stitching software” that holds these subjects 
together diachronically, bound into a single persisting subject. This leaves insurmountable gaps 
between short-term subject-experience-episodes.
18  Siewert pointed out that it is a category mistake to claim, as Zahavi does, that mineness (as a 
feature of experience) is the experiential self, but we can safely claim that mineness implies an 
experiential self. Mineness as Zahavi understands it, could indicate that there is something more 
than experiences and their relations to a subject of experience. Since integrated information is 
a relation it does not answer the demands of mineness.
19  See Coleman’s paper in Bruntrup & Jaskolla (2016) for discussion.
20  Therefore, IIT seems to be threatened by the nonsubject/subject gap. See Chalmers (2016) for 
discussion on these issues.
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5. Conclusion
There is much phenomenological evidence to the claim that something like mine-
ness or pre-reflective self-awareness exists and plays a crucial role in our understand-
ing of consciousness. These issues (of self-awareness) have recently come to the 
center of interest in modern philosophy of mind and are not to be neglected if one is 
to build a successful theory of consciousness. The phenomenological fact of mineness 
cannot be denied and dismissed and it is not accounted for in a proper way by Inte-
grated Information Theory in its present version.  Such inflationary understanding of 
mineness, self-awareness and subjectivity in general, creates a problem for the exter-
nalist model of the Integrated Information Theory. More work is to be done on future 
versions of IIT, in order to properly fit the subjective character of consciousness into 
the architecture of Integrated Information Theory. 
Janko Nešić
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Da li integrisanoj informaciji nedostaje subjektivnost?
(Apstrakt)
U radu ispitujem kakav status subjektivnost ima u teoriji integrisane informacije. 
Postavljam pitanje da li teorija integrisane informacije rešava „teški“ problem svesti. 
Po sebi, ova teorija ne može dati odgovor na „teški“ problem svesti, ali postoji 
mogućnost da se teorija integrisanih informacija kombinuje sa panpsihizmom kako 
bi odgovorila na metafizičke probleme koji se pred nju, kao teoriju svesti, postavljaju. 
Argumentujem da i tako unapređena teorija integrisane informacije ne uključuje ad-
ekvatno objašnjenje subjektivnog karaktera svesti. 
ključne reči: integrisana informacija, svest, subjektivnost, iskustvo, panpsihizam
